Broadcom disclosed and patched a critical VMware vCenter Server vulnerability on November 19 — but a China-linked espionage group had already been exploiting it since early September. Tracked as CVE-2026-123890 and carrying a CVSS score of 9.8, the authentication bypass flaw gives an unauthenticated attacker with network access full administrator control over vCenter, the central management console for VMware’s virtualization infrastructure. With vCenter deployed in data centres worldwide to manage ESXi hosts and virtual machines, the exposure is enormous.
What Happened
Mandiant and Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) jointly disclosed that the threat actor they track as ARMORY CASTLE — formerly known as UNC5221, a suspected People’s Republic of China (PRC) nexus espionage group — exploited the zero-day using a custom Go-based tool they call BONESAW. The tool carries a build timestamp of July 13, 2026, though Mandiant notes that Go build metadata can be altered before compilation, so the actual development timeline may stretch even further back.
The vulnerability resides in the VMware Directory Service (vmdir), the identity and authentication backbone of vCenter’s Single Sign-On (SSO) system. According to Mandiant’s analysis, the flaw exposes a Secure Remote Password (SRP) session key over the directory service’s RPC interface on TCP port 2012. An attacker who captures that key can establish a session as administrator@vsphere.local — no password required, no user interaction needed.
Critically, this is a different bug from CVE-2026-59309, the CVSS 9.8 vmdir authentication bypass that Broadcom patched in July. Mandiant confirmed that BONESAW worked against a vCenter instance already patched against that earlier flaw, meaning organisations that diligently applied the summer patch were still vulnerable.
The Attack Chain
The vCenter compromise was part of a broader, multi-stage intrusion. ARMORY CASTLE initially gained access by exploiting a separate zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764), which CISA added to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog in October. From the compromised remote support appliance, the attackers pivoted laterally to an internal Linux system that lacked endpoint detection and response (EDR) coverage — a gap they deliberately targeted.
Once on the internal network, the group scanned for VMware services, located the vCenter RPC interface on port 2012, and deployed BONESAW. The tool abused CVE-2026-123890 to copy the vCenter directory database, steal the SAML signing key, and create a rogue SSO administrator account.
A second custom tool, SAWSNAKE, then forged SAML authentication tokens using the stolen signing key — the well-known “Golden SAML” technique. This allowed the attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication entirely and impersonate any user in the environment. With this level of access, they enabled SSH on the vCenter appliance, extracted its master key and PostgreSQL credentials, then disabled SSH again to cover their tracks. They even pulled Active Directory database files directly from guest virtual machine disks.
A Growing Arsenal of Custom Malware
Mandiant catalogued a total of six malware families used in this campaign, reflecting a significant expansion in ARMORY CASTLE’s post-compromise capabilities:
- BONESAW — Go-based exploitation tool purpose-built for CVE-2026-123890
- SAWSNAKE — Go utility for forging vCenter SAML tokens (Golden SAML)
- BEARBONES — A backdoored Dropbear SSH server configured to log plaintext passwords
- SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH — JSP-based webshells enabling command execution and file uploads on compromised servers
- LAZYBONES — A Slack-based backdoor observed in earlier ARMORY CASTLE intrusions, using the messaging platform’s API for command and control
Mandiant assesses that BONESAW was “likely developed for broader operations,” suggesting that additional victims beyond those currently known may exist.
Who Is Affected
The vulnerability affects vCenter Server versions 8.0, 9.0, and 9.1, as well as the vCenter builds bundled within VMware Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation, and Broadcom’s Telco Cloud Platform and Infrastructure products. Older versions no longer under active support — including vSphere 6.5, 6.7, and 7.0 — should be presumed vulnerable, according to Broadcom.
Fixed versions are:
- vCenter 9.1.x → 9.1.1.0200
- vCenter 9.0.x → 9.0.2.0200
- vCenter 8.0 → 8.0 U3m
- Cloud Foundation 5.x → 5.2.5
Broadcom’s advisory classifies the update as an “emergency change” under ITIL methodology. No workarounds exist — patching is the only remediation.
The same advisory (VMSA-2026-0009) also addresses four additional vulnerabilities: a SQL injection in SDDC Manager (CVE-2026-123891, CVSS 8.1), a command injection in SDDC Manager (CVE-2026-123892, CVSS 7.2), a privilege escalation to root on the SDDC Manager appliance (CVE-2026-123893, CVSS 6.7), and a SAML token signature bypass in VMware Tools for Windows (CVE-2026-123894, CVSS 6.7). Notably, the three SDDC Manager bugs were reported by NATO’s Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). Broadcom reports no active exploitation of these four flaws.
A Troubling Pattern
This is the second critical authentication bypass in VMware Directory Service this year. When CVE-2026-59309 was patched in July, attacks against the companion directory-traversal flaw (CVE-2026-59310) began within five days of disclosure and went on to compromise an estimated 361 IP addresses across 47 countries, with some intrusions leading to Babuk-derived ransomware deployments on ESXi hosts.
ARMORY CASTLE has a history of targeting edge appliances and security infrastructure. Known for exploiting vulnerabilities in network and security products since at least 2023, the group’s shift to post-compromise zero-day exploitation of virtualisation management platforms represents what Mandiant calls “a significant expansion” of their operational capability.
What to Do Now
Organisations running VMware vCenter should treat this as an emergency and apply the patched versions immediately. Beyond patching, Mandiant recommends several detection and hardening steps:
- Restrict access to TCP port 2012 on vCenter to trusted management hosts only
- Audit SSO accounts for any administrator accounts you did not create
- Review VAMI logs for SSH being enabled and then quickly disabled — a signature of this group’s tradecraft
- Hunt for anomalous SSH banners, specifically servers announcing “SSH-2.0-pulsesecure_23345” on high ports, which is associated with the BEARBONES backdoor
- Deploy EDR on internal Linux appliances, which ARMORY CASTLE deliberately targets as blind spots
If any indicators of compromise are found, organisations must rotate the vCenter STS signing certificate and all SSO credentials. Without this step, forged SAML tokens created before the patch can continue to grant access indefinitely.
The disclosure underscores a persistent reality in enterprise security: virtualisation infrastructure, once compromised, gives attackers the keys to the entire data centre. When a nation-state group sits undetected on that infrastructure for more than two months, the potential for data exfiltration and persistent access is vast.
Sources: Broadcom VMSA-2026-0009 advisory; Mandiant/GTIG threat intelligence report; The Hacker News; SecurityOnline.info; Broadcom advisory FAQ
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